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Anderson: No More Vietnams

No More Vietnams: Historians Debate the Policy Lessons of
the Vietnam War
By David L. Anderson
Summary
In this article, Anderson explores the reasons that make the resolution of key
historical questions regarding the Vietnam War elusive and that make it difficult for scholars as well as laypersons to understand the conflict and consider the ramifications of its meaning for American diplomatic and military
doctrines. His compelling reflection leads to an unavoidable conclusion of
particular relevance as the American people face the challenge of Iraq: the
American war in Vietnam could have and should have been avoided. This
article has been previously published in The War That Never Ends: New
Perspectives on the Vietnam War, edited by David L. Anderson and John
Ernst and published by the University Press of Kentucky, 2007.
It has been thirty years since the end of
the Vietnam War, and historians of
American foreign relations are still vigorously debating the historical questions
of why the United States chose to persist
in a major military campaign in Vietnam
for so long and why, ultimately, that
costly and controversial intervention
failed to achieve Washington’s stated
objectives. Thousands of books and articles have been published on the American war in Vietnam advancing knowledge and understanding of the conflict,
and yet the lessons learned and the
meaning of the war for American diplomatic and military doctrine are still contested. What makes resolution of such
important historical questions remain so
elusive?
The war has left conflicting mythologies that continue to battle with each
other. Boiled down to an extreme simplification, the debate is over the concept
of “no more Vietnams.” One interpreta-
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tion of this term is that the United States
must abjure from virtually all types of
military intervention abroad. The term
“Vietnam syndrome” came into use after
the war to describe a pathological aversion among American policy makers to
the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. The other understanding of
the term “no more Vietnams” is that the
United States must never again “lose” in
cases in which defense of the nation’s
security requires military intervention.
Proponents of this view argue that the
United States should get over the Vietnam syndrome and regain the political
will to use America’s massive power to
achieve foreign policy objectives. In
both cases, there is an implication that
the United States, because of its power
and the global reach of its interests, can
chose where and when to engage its
military force.
The Vietnam War was a war of choice.
The Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and
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Nixon administrations chose to define
the survival of South Vietnam as a vital
strategic interest of the United States in
the global policy of containment of Soviet and Chinese power.
Official
American rhetoric increasingly exaggerated the value of the objective as domestic opponents of the war questioned the
choice and the cost of the intervention.
There is a proclivity when policy makers
choose war to over-promise to the nation
the results of the intervention and to under-state the costs to the nation in order
to justify continuing the intervention.
One example of such an over-promise is
to couch the reason for continuing the
intervention in terms of preserving
America’s international “credibility.”
Wars of choice, like the Vietnam War,
leave a gap between ends and means that
almost invariably produces division, dissatisfaction, and domestic debilitation. 1
The last American war that was not a
war of choice was World War II. The
danger to U.S. interests posed by the
strength and ideology of the Axis powers
left the United States no choice but to
defend itself and its historical allies.
World War II is often termed the “good
war” and the Vietnam War the “bad
war.” The Korean War in between the
two gets obscured as a forgotten, stalemated war. The reasons for fighting the
good war were much more self-evident
to Americans than were the reasons for
the bad war. Moreover, the Unites
States won the good war by the rational
standard that the hostile power and oppressive ideology of the nation’s enemies had been nullified. American
forces came home to well-deserved victory celebrations and national selfcongratulations. The reasons for fight-

ing the bad war were much less evident,
however. The small, rural country of
Vietnam lacked the power to threaten the
United States directly, and its internal
politics were much too localized to be a
crucial test of American ideology. In the
end, there was no U.S. “victory” in Vietnam, and thus the questions were left
open as to whether a victory was ever
possible, how it could have been
achieved, and, most challenging, what
would have constituted victory.
At the end of Oliver Stone’s movie
Platoon about the realities of combat for
American soldiers in Vietnam, the young
G.I. who is the main character reflects:
“I think now looking back that we did
not fight the enemy, we fought ourselves
and the enemy was within us.” 2 In the
context of the film, the line is a wellknow literary allusion to works such as
Joseph Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness
that explore the presence of evil within
the human psyche. The line could also
be applied to what has become the historical exploration of the essence of
American foreign policy as revealed by
the Vietnam War. In much of the writing on the war, Vietnam and the Vietnamese are backdrops to what is more an
examination of America and the Americans. Conflicting ideas of what Americans are as a people and of their values
and beliefs become the points of analysis
and argument.
Throughout its history, the United
States has been shaped by both ambition
and altruism. As a young nation, it was
purposefully and consciously expansionist and idealist. It sought to build its
own power and influence, and this ambition was at times at the expense of
weaker nations, including Native Ameri-

1. “Interchange: Legacies of the Vietnam
War,” Journal of American History 93 (September 2006): 487-88.

2. Quoted in Katherine Kinney, Friendly Fire:
American Images of the Vietnam War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.
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can peoples, Mexico, and Spain. It
sought also to share the benefits of liberty.
The American self-perception
forged in the American Revolution was
of a nation that was the freest, most democratic, most republican, and most
progressive in history, and with that perception was a sense of responsibility to
share this ideal with others. This sense
of mission combined with a sense of survival in a competitive world to form a
potent prescription for an assertive and
ambiguous U.S. role in international affairs. In World War II for a brief historical moment, American might and
right converged in a victory over tyrannical forces. In Vietnam, the United
States experienced the limits of its power
and its righteousness. Consequently, the
Vietnam War has become not just the
bad war but the endless war, a subject
locked into a protracted debate over the
responsibility for and the significance of
the outcome.
This debate over the policy lessons of
the war is not an abstract academic exercise in critical thinking. The United
States failed to insure the survival of its
ally, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN),
but its enemy, the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV), did not defeat the
United States as a nation. America remained a world power that was able,
perhaps even expected, to apply its
strength and influence in other international conflicts. Historians, policy analysts, and national leaders have offered
numerous explanations of what the Vietnam War reveals as a guide to U.S. policies in the present. This process of reflection began even while the war was in
progress and has continued ever since in
some clearly discernable phases.
The official rationale for U.S. intervention in the affairs of Vietnam, as presented by American presidents from
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Truman through Ford, was the importance of the future of Vietnam in terms
of the global Cold War that pitted the
interests and ideology of the United
States against the interests and ideology
of the Soviet Union. When the French
war with the Communist-led Vietminh
began in 1946, the Truman administration initially took a neutral position in a
conflict that was manifestly an attempt
by France to regain the colonial authority over Indochina that had slipped from
its grasp during Japan’s wartime occupation of the region. By 1950, however, the
increasingly dangerous Cold War in
Europe, the victory of the Chinese
Communist Party in China’s Civil War,
the USSR’s successful test of an atomic
bomb, and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s
reckless claims of Communist agents
within the U.S. government had caused
Washington to reexamine its perception
of the Indochina conflict. When Truman
ordered American troops to Korea in
June 1950 to counter the threat of Communist North Korea to the U.S.-backed
republic in South Korea, the Cold War
went to Asia. In 1954, as the French
grew weary of their eight-year war
against the Vietminh, President Eisenhower employed the metaphor of falling
dominoes to declare the containment of
the spread of communist regimes in
Southeast Asia to be a vital strategic imperative of the United States. By the
early 1960s, there was a consensus view
among American leaders that the United
States must contain communist political
power wherever it appeared–a consensus
seemingly reconfirmed by a U.S-Soviet
arms race, communist-led revolution in
Cuba, military confrontation over Berlin,
civil war in Laos, and a mounting armed
insurgency organized by Communist
Party cadre against the government in
South Vietnam.
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The idea that the containment of world
communism somehow required the
United States to be involved in Vietnam
appeared in all the official explanations
of the growing commitment of U.S. support for the survival of a South Vietnamese state independent of the communist
North Vietnamese regime that had
grown out of the Vietminh’s successful
resistance to the French. Although historical scholarship on Vietnam was woefully slim in the United States in the
early 1960s, a body of American scholarship slowly developed as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam grew. In the
1960s and the 1970s a first wave of historical analysis emerged.
Unlike the early historical studies of
the Cold War that largely supported the
validity of Washington’s decision to
seek to contain Soviet and later Chinese
power, the initial American histories of
the Vietnam War questioned the applicability of the Cold War paradigm to the
internal conflict in Vietnam. Pioneering
scholarship such as The United States in
Vietnam by George M. Kahin and John
W. Lewis and The Two Vietnams by
Bernard Fall criticized U.S. policy makers for overlooking the nationalism of
Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists and for failing to understand the
internal politics of Vietnam. Departing
from the Cold War model in which the
orthodox scholarship was sympathetic to
official policy, the standard or orthodox
interpretation of most historians writing
about the Vietnam War was highly critical of the official rationales. These criticisms did not all take the same form.
Liberals such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr.
and David Halberstam believed that
American officials were often wellmeaning but were too ignorant of Vietnam and arrogant about their own and
America’s abilities to understand the

21

conflict. These writers characterized
U.S. policy in Vietnam as a “quagmire”
that had gradually trapped the United
States in an unintended military commitment. Department of Defense analysts working in the late 1960s on a
study that became known as the Pentagon Papers, after one of its author’s–
Daniel Ellsberg–leaked it to the press in
1971, disagreed with the quagmire thesis. These scholars, including Ellsberg
and Leslie Gelb, developed a so-called
stalemate argument that maintained that
U.S. leaders understood early on that
there was no good American solution to
the civil war in Vietnam but that these
leaders persisted in the war rather than
admit a mistake and risk the loss of their
political power. Radical historians such
as Gabriel Kolko went beyond the cynicism of the stalemate argument and contended that it was not lack of political
courage that compelled U.S. policy but
rather an American drive for hegemony
and world order that made all revolutionary movements enemies to be defeated. 3
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
various criticisms of the government’s
strategic thinking about Vietnam began
3. George M. Kahin and John W. Lewis, The
United States in Vietnam, rev. ed. (New York:
Delta, 1969); Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis, 2nd ed.
(New York: Praeger, 1967); Arthur M.
Schlesinger Jr., The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam
and American Democracy, 1941-1966 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1966); David Halberstam,
The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random
House, 1964); Leslie Gelb and Richard K. Betts,
The Irony of Vietnam: They System Worked
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979);
Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1972); Gabriel Kolko,
Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States,
and the Modern Historical Experience (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1985); Robert A. Divine,
“Vietnam Reconsidered,” Diplomatic History 12
(Winter 1988): 79-93.
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to coalesce into a prevailing historical
interpretation that came to be labeled
“flawed containment” or “liberalrealist.” 4 Relying on classified documents made public in the Pentagon Papers, journalists’ accounts, and other
evidence, many historians agreed that
the containment policy originally conceived to counter Soviet political and
military power in Europe after World
War II had only limited utility, if any, as
an American policy doctrine in Southeast Asia. The realist aspect of this critique noted that the Soviet army was not
in the region as it was in Eastern Europe
and that the post-colonial nations of Indochina were not closely connected economically and historically to the United
States as were the nations of Western
Europe. Many U.S. strategists considered China to be America’s enemy but
also had been wary, since the Korean
War, of the huge risks entailed in any
military conflict with China. Consequently, the strategic value of Vietnam
to the United States was low, and the
costs of intervention there were high.
The liberal portion of the argument came
from recognition by many historians that
the nationalist aspirations of Vietnamese
leaders such as Ho Chi Minh, who had
resisted French colonialism, were not
unlike historic American values, despite
the Vietnamese Communists’ professions of Marxist ideology.
One of the first books to synthesize
this flawed containment thesis from then
available records and scholarship was
America’s Longest War by George Her-

ring. Herring’s 1979 book acknowledged that policy lessons from the war
remained elusive, but on the central
point he was direct: “That containment
was misapplied in Vietnam, however,
seems beyond debate.” His book has
had four editions. Although he has revised many sections based upon the outpouring of documents and monographs
over the years, his conclusions have remained basically the same. His argument is that the external or global U.S.
strategy of blocking Soviet and Chinese
communist influence wherever it spread
led the United States to seriously misjudge the internal dynamics of Indochina. “By intervening in what was essentially a local struggle,” Herring argued, “it placed itself at the mercy of
local forces, a weak client, and a determined adversary.” Despite the use of
abundantly destructive military force,
Washington found its power to settle the
political questions of Vietnam “beyond
the ability of the United States.” 5
In addition to Herring, a number of
other historians have penned studies
with a similar argument that is sometimes termed “neo-orthodox” to distinguish from the earlier quagmire thesis. 6
In the 1980s, the journalist-historian
Stanley Karnow produced a sweeping
narrative history of how the United
States was “playing for global stakes” in
Indochina, and George Kahin revived his
earlier argument in a new book, Intervention: “Nearly all American officials .
. . perceived Vietnamese communism as
one of the fronts of contest with the So-

4. Gary R. Hess, “The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War,” Diplomatic History
18 (Spring 1994): 246; Robert J. McMahon,
“U.S.-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographical Survey,” in Pacific Passage: The Study of
American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the
Twenty-First Century, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 316.

5. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War:
The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 4th
ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 357-58.
Compare George C. Herring, America’s Longest
War: The United States and Vietnam, 19501975, 1st ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1979), 270-71.
6. Hess, “Unending Debate,” 246.
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viet Union and China–critically dependent on the two major communist powers
rather than drawing most of its strength
from a fundamentally autonomous national foundation.” 7 In a specific examination of the containment policy in
Indochina, William J. Duiker, an acclaimed biographer of Ho Chi Minh,
concluded that the Truman, Eisenhower,
and Kennedy administrations “defined
Vietnam as a ‘test case’ of U.S. capacity
to stem the advance of communism into
vulnerable areas throughout the Third
World.” 8 In another major study, Robert
Schulzinger declared that “had American
leaders not thought that all international
events were connected to the Cold War
there would have been no American war
in Vietnam.” 9
The liberal-realist explanations of why
the United States intervened militarily in
Vietnam in support of the Republic of
Vietnam lead to the proposition that the
war was not winnable in any meaningful
sense for the United States and hence
should never have been undertaken.
Historians of this school recall the assessment made by General Matthew
Ridgway, when he contemplated the
possibility of U.S. military involvement
in Indochina during the French war. He
contended that it would be the wrong
war, in the wrong place, and against the
wrong enemy. The orthodox historians
argue that American intervention was a
misapplication of containment, a failure
7. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New
York: Penguin Books, 1983), 169; George McT.
Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986),
126.
8. William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy
and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1994), 2.
9. Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The
United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 329.

23

to understand local conditions in Southeast Asia, and a product of arrogance or
ideological obsession. These factors
prevented a clear definition of objectives
and of the means available to attain
those objectives. In other words, there
was no successful American strategy
that is apparent to these authors.
As the liberal-realist interpretation was
emerging in the late 1970s and early
1980s, a conservative revisionist school
began to challenge what had become the
orthodox view. These revisionist historians largely accepted the official reasoning that U.S. intervention in Vietnam
was necessary to contain international
communist expansion. Just as the Vietnam War orthodoxy reversed the pattern
of Cold War scholarship in its criticisms
of U.S. strategy, the Vietnam War revisionists departed from the Cold War labels and became the defenders of
American interventionism. One of the
earliest revisionists was political scientist Guenter Lewy, who wrote in 1978
that events since 1975 had demonstrated
that the American failure to prevent a
communist triumph in Southeast Asia
had weakened the faith in American
commitments. “In the wake of the
trauma of Vietnam,” Lewy maintained,
“America is in the grip of a ‘No more
Vietnams’ psychology which stands in
sharp contrast to the spirit of active involvement in global affairs prevailing in
the years since World War II; . . . there
is no reason to assume that the weakening of America’s will to act will make
for a better and more peaceful world.” 10
The failure of containment in Vietnam
concerned the revisionists, and they concentrated their research, not on the origins of the U.S. commitment, but on the
way the United States fought the war
10. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 426-28.
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and how it could have been successful.
There were three types of revisionist arguments: (1) that the United States did
not make sufficient use of its enormous
conventional military power, (2) that the
United States military tactics were too
conventional and failed to adapt to the
challenges of guerrilla warfare, and (3)
that military victory may not have been
feasible but that the effort still had moral
and strategic value.
The first argument that a conventional
military victory was available in Vietnam to the United States could be found
in memoirs and histories written by high
ranking officers who had led U.S. forces
in Vietnam. U.S. Army colonel Harry
Summers wrote a particularly influential
book, On Strategy, published in 1982,
that began with the premise that the war
was basically an assault by the DRV
across an international boundary against
the separate and sovereign RVN. Citing
the classic military doctrines of Karl von
Clausewitz, Summers reasoned that the
United States should have positioned its
forces to isolate the battlefield in the
South in order to concentrate its superior
firepower on enemy targets. Instead, he
claimed, civilian U.S. strategists in the
Department of Defense fashioned a dispersed and gradual deployment of U.S.
forces against guerrilla forces that had
little chance of stopping the DRV aggression against the RVN. Summers’s
book became a standard military history
text for educating a new generation of
U.S. officers. A number of general officers who had served in Vietnam, including General William C. Westmoreland
and Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp,
who held the highest level command positions as the U.S. war escalated, agreed
with this analysis. They insisted that
higher levels of U.S. ground and air
power and fewer restrictions from offi-
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cials in Washington would have enabled
them to force Hanoi into a negotiated
settlement that would have preserved the
RVN. 11
The orthodox historians have challenged this argument, sometimes labeled
the “win thesis,” on a number of points.
They begin at the beginning–noting the
lack of attention it gives to the political
and social origins of the conflict. The
demilitarized zone along the seventeenth
parallel, rather than form an international
boundary between North and South
Vietnam, delineated two “regroupment
zones” for implementation of the ceasefire ending the French-Vietminh war in
1954. Within South Vietnam, the government was corrupt and oppressive. It
had little or no allegiance from many in
the population, and no level of American
military power could make it popular. In
the view of some historians, American
air power and other high technology and
destructive warfare inflicted so much
damage on the South Vietnamese population that this form of support for the
RVN government only served to alienate
the population from the Saigon regime.
If the liberal-realists are correct that no
amount of force could have produced an
American victory in Vietnam, then was
the United States incapable of winning
11. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA:
Presidio, 1982); Bruce Palmer Jr., The 25 Year
War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984);
Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988);
Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an
American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (San Rafael, CA: Presidio,
1985); Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, CA:
Presidio, 1978); William R. Westmoreland, A
Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1976); Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978).
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the war? 12
The advocates of the second version of
revisionism maintain that the United
States could have overcome the political
insurgency against the Saigon government by following a pacification strategy. Rather than relying on massive
force, the approach should have been to
provide population security and government services, such as health care and
agricultural technology, to win the population to the government’s side. In actual practice, General Westmoreland and
other commanders put more effort into
attrition, killing the enemy, than in pacification, but some military historians and
former aid officials have argued that,
had counterinsurgency been made the
primary approach, the result would have
been better and certainly no worse than
it was for the United States and its Saigon ally. 13
The notion that there was an American
solution to the contest for internal political power in Vietnam is dubious, however. The course and outcome of the

Vietnam War were not a question of
American failure but also of Vietnamese
success. Some studies of individual U.S.
combat units that gave serious attention
to village security and local improvements have found that these programs
did not translate into loyalty to the Saigon regime after the Americans left the
area. Other localized studies of particular
villages or provinces have shown that
the resistance to external interference–
Chinese, French, American–has deep
historical and cultural roots in Vietnam.
Similarly, real economic and social inequities and injustices provided fertile
ground for revolution. The Vietnamese
communists were not infallible and had
their own internal divisions, but they
also had advantages. They combined
their disciplined and ruthless political
tactics with appeals to patriotism and
justice to create an effective strategy for
withstanding the might of the powerful
Americans. 14
It is, in fact, because the communistled DRV and NLF were such formidable

12. George C. Herring, “America and Vietnam:
The Debate Continues,” American Historical
Review 92 (1987): 350-62; Gary R. Hess, “The
Military Perspective on Strategy in Vietnam:
Harry G. Summers’s On Strategy and Bruce
Palmer’s The 25 Year War,” Diplomatic History
10 (1986): 91-106; Jeffrey Kimball, “The Stabin-the-back Legend and the Vietnam War,”
Armed Forces and Society 14 (1988); 433-58.
13. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and
Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986); Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The
American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and
Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995);
Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S.
Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1986); William E. Colby
and James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand
Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement
in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books,
1989); Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John
Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York:
Random House, 1988).

14. Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat:
The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the
Americans in Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown,
1972); Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An:
Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972);
James W. Trullinger Jr., Village at War: An Account of Revolution in Vietnam (New York:
Longman, 1980); Douglas Pike, History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976 (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1978); James P. Harrison, The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for
Independence (New York: Free Press, 1982);
David W. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta,
1930-1975 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002);
William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh (New York:
Hyperion, 2000); Marc Jason Gilbert, “Introduction,” in Why the North Won the Vietnam War,
ed. Marc Jason Gilbert (New York: Palgrave,
2002), 1-45.
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opponents that the third school of revisionists, labeled “legitimatists” by historian Gary Hess, developed their analysis. 15 Like other revisionists, they accept the premise that Washington’s
global credibility as a deterrent to Moscow and Beijing in the Cold War required the United States not to yield the
future of Vietnam to the regime in Hanoi
without a fight. The international strategic balance of power was at stake, in
their view. They also point to the executions, re-education camps, forced emigration, and other abuses of the communist regime following its 1975 reunification of Vietnam as evidence of the brutality and immorality of Hanoi’s leaders.
Another variation on this revisionism are
those studies that contend that the Saigon regime, for all of its weaknesses,
was not so corrupt and venal as to be
worse than its opponents. The legitimatists acknowledge, however, that the
chance of American success in Vietnam
was never very good. In effect, they
borrow from both the orthodox and revisionist schools to contend that the United
States was correct to intervene in Vietnam and also correct to get out. 16
The end of the Cold War in 1990 affected this debate among historians of
the Vietnam War but did not end it. For
revisionists, the dissolution of the Soviet
Union confirmed the validity of con15. Hess, “Unending Debate,” 243-46.
16. Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were in Vietnam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983);
Timothy J. Lomperis, From People’s War to
People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the
Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996); R. B. Smith, An
International History of the Vietnam War, 3 vols.
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984-90); Ellen
J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in
Vietnam, 1963 (New York: Dutton, 1987); Patrick L. Hatcher, The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
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tainment as a strategy. Journalist Michael Lind wrote in 1999, for example,
that “the sound and ultimately successful
Cold War grand strategy of global military containment of the communist bloc
required Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to escalate U.S. involvement in
Vietnam rather than withdraw without a
major effort. . . . Once the Vietnam War
is viewed in the context of the Cold War,
it looks less like a tragic error than like a
battle that could hardly be avoided.” 17
A new, post-Cold War generation of liberal-realist scholars, however, reaffirms
that containment was a flawed concept
in Southeast Asia. These scholars, some
of whom have made significant use of
Vietnamese historical archives now open
to research, go beyond the orthodoxrevisionist debate to refocus study of the
origins of the American intervention
from the Cold War context to a postcolonial context. Mark Philip Bradley,
for example, describes his research on
American and Vietnamese images of
each other at the end of World War II as
an effort “to locate and analyze the relationship between Vietnam and the
United States within the larger sweep of
the international history of the twentieth
century in which the global discourse
and practices of colonialism, race, modernism, and postcolonial state making at
once preceded, were profoundly implicated in, and ultimately transcended the
dynamics of the Cold War.” 18
Another example of this new scholarship is Mark Lawrence’s Assuming the
Burden, which details how British,
17. Michael Lind, Vietnam, the Necessary War:
A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous
Military Conflict (New York: The Free Press,
1999), 256.
18. Mark Philip Bradley, Imagining Vietnam
and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000), 8.
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French, and American leaders came to
identify Vietnam as a Cold War battle
ground in 1949-1950. He terms it “a
tragic moment when Western governments moved decisively toward forceful
solutions that reduced complex social
conflicts in many parts of the world to
mere expressions of the confrontation
between Western liberal capitalism and
Soviet-led communism.” 19 Bradley provides a good summary of the current liberal-realist position: “Without question
the Cold War provided the larger frame
that shaped American involvement in
Vietnam. . . . But if one accepts the
premise that Vietnam was the wrong
place to fight the larger Cold War battle
(as I and I think many others do), you
have to look elsewhere to understand the
forces shaping American commitment
and policy toward Vietnam.” 20
Not only has some form of the orthodox or critical view of the U.S. decision
to intervene militarily in Vietnam in the
name of containment persisted and been
buttressed by new archival research, the
American public’s doubts about the war
have remained fairly consistent over the
years. When Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson first increased the deployment
of American ground and air power to
Vietnam, members of the press, of Congress, and the public generally accepted
Washington’s official Cold War explanations of the policy. By 1967, however, hundreds of thousands of Americans had served a tour of duty in Vietnam, thousands of tons of American
bombs had rained down on Indochina,
millions of dollars had been spent, and
19. Mark Atwood Lawrence, Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to
War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 282.
20. “Interchange: Legacies of the Vietnam
War,” 472.

27

thousands of Americans and tens of
thousands of Vietnamese had been killed
or injured in the conflict. Americans
grew increasingly skeptical of their government’s explanation of how the survival of a weak and corrupt government
in Saigon justified these high costs and
the massive level of destruction. In early
1968, the DRV and NLF surprised
American military commanders with a
military operation throughout South
Vietnam known as the Tet Offensive.
Although the attacks did not topple the
Saigon government as Hanoi had hoped,
the ability of the Communists to launch
the offensive after three years of pounding by American power persuaded many
Americans that the drama in Vietnam
was not worth the price of the ticket.
Most historians of all types agree that
the Tet Offensive was the turning point
when American leaders began to respond to political pressure to find a way
to end the active U.S. participation in the
war. The public sense that somehow the
Vietnam War was “fundamentally wrong
and immoral,” that first gained broad
acceptance following Tet, has continued
to appear in public opinion polls. Although every president beginning with
Nixon has asserted, as have the revisionist historians, that the American intervention in Vietnam was honorable and
credible and was consistent with American strategic and historic interests, one
careful analysis of American public
memory of the war has found: “A strong
majority have long held, and continue to
hold, that U.S. intervention represented
not just an instrumental failure but a
moral failure.” 21
Why and how the Nixon administra21. Robert McMahon, “Contested Memory: The
Vietnam War and American Society, 19752001,” Diplomatic History 26 (Spring 2002):
175.
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tion continued to wage the American
war for four more years after the Tet Offensive before withdrawing the last U.S.
forces has generated further historical
debate over the meaning of the Vietnam
experience and its meaning for present
American policy making. What has
emerged is a curious dichotomy between
the prevailing understanding among historians and the public on one hand and
the revisionist historians and many policy makers on the other hand of the term
“no more Vietnams.” The first group is
instinctively wary of military intervention since the Vietnam war if the alignment of American interests and the local
issues in a conflict are not perfectly
clear, and the second group is determined to apply overwhelming American
power in the name of American ideals in
any case in which America decides its
specific or general interests are at stake.
The historical debate over Nixon’s actions that has continued the orthodox and
revisionist split over the policy lessons
of the war comes from differing versions
of what has come to be known as the
“decent interval” thesis: the idea that the
Nixon administration believed long before 1973 that the U.S. objective was not
victory but the creation of a significant
period between the U.S. military withdrawal and the inevitable collapse of the
Saigon government. This decent interval
presumably would protect the credibility
of U.S. foreign policy by separating
American actions from the war’s outcome. Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his
national security advisor and principal
foreign policy aide, have argued in their
memoirs that they wore down the DRV
through firm diplomacy backed by Vietnamization–the preparation of the RVN
to defend itself–and the willingness to
use American air power, and that they
produced a “peace with honor” in Viet-
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nam in 1973. Kissinger has insisted that
the agreement signed in Paris “could
have worked” and that “the agreement
could have been maintained.” “We
sought not an interval before collapse,”
he declares in his account, “but lasting
peace with honor.” Kissinger concludes
that, without Watergate, the congressional investigation that led to articles of
impeachment against Nixon, and the resulting “collapse of executive authority,”
the United States “would have succeeded” in Vietnam. 22 Nixon and Kissinger charge that the DRV flagrantly
violated the terms of the peace and that
in 1975, after Nixon had resigned his
office, the blame is on Congress for not
approving the financial aid that the RVN
needed to survive the continuing aggression. “In the end, Vietnam was lost on
the political front in the United States,
Nixon wrote later, not on the battlefield
in Southeast Asia.” 23 In concert with the
revisionist historians, Nixon and Kissinger advanced a win thesis that the
United States could have prevailed.
Other analysts view these claims of
success differently. The intense secrecy
of the Nixon White House makes it difficult for historians to know what Nixon
and Kissinger really thought would be
the outcome in Vietnam after America’s
departure, but it is clear that they began
even as the treaty was being signed to try
to avoid any appearance of American
humiliation. They set out immediately
“to make an American failure look like a
success,” in the words of Arnold Isaacs,
“and thus preserve America’s reputation
elsewhere in the world.” 24 More than a
22. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 1470.
23. Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New
York: Arbor House, 1985), 15.
24. Arnold Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in
Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: Vintage,
1984), 498.
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month before the signing of the January1973 agreement, Nixon ordered his
chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, to begin
an aggressive public relations campaign
to portray the president as a peacemaker
and the approaching diplomatic settlement as a success. In some tangible
ways, the revisionist school of Vietnam
war historiography was born in the
Nixon White House. 25
Despite the president’s and his adviser’s claims that they had a strategy for
victory in Vietnam, there is considerable
evidence that, as early as the fall of
1969, the administration had an explicit
decent interval strategy. After almost a
year in office, Nixon and Kissinger were
finding that they were getting no closer
to a diplomatic and military victory than
had Johnson and his aides and that the
cost of the war in American lives and
treasure continued to mount. They rejected out of hand the option of a unilateral U.S. withdrawal, which Kissinger
said left two alternatives–escalation or
Vietnamization. Planning began for
dramatic increase of U.S. bombing and
other military pressure on the DRV coupled with a virtual ultimatum to Hanoi in
an operation code named Duck Hook.
The administration gave up this escalation choice, however, because it understood that public and political opinion in
the United States demanded smaller not
greater American effort in Vietnam. In
June it had begun withdrawing U.S.
troops from South Vietnam. It also
knew that Saigon was not ready to assume its own defense and might never
be. Nixon’s policy had become, in
Isaacs’s words, “a sort of slow-motion
defeat.” 26
25. Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998),
368.
26. Isaacs, Without Honor, 491-92. See also

29

On November 3, 1969, Nixon gave a
major address, often referred to as his
Silent Majority speech for its assertion
that most Americans supported his policies, in which he heralded Vietnamization and did not issue a public threat and
ultimatum to the DRV. Jeffrey Kimball
has argued that this speech began the
decent interval strategy that defined
American success in Vietnam as leaving
a South Vietnamese government strong
enough to defend itself. The U.S. objective no longer was to force Hanoi to recognize the southern regime and to cease
its aggression against the RVN. Kissinger’s notes in preparation for his 1971
secret meetings with Chinese leaders
reveal that he would inform them: “If the
Vietnamese people themselves decide to
change the present government, we shall
accept it.” 27 Larry Berman agrees that
Nixon backed away from escalation in
1969 and touted Vietnamization for
domestic political reasons, but he believes that Nixon would have reverted to
escalation after the 1973 accords. Pierre
Asselin finds that the Paris agreement
served immediate political and strategic
needs for both sides but that it was
bound to fail and all the negotiators
knew it. 28 Although Kimball, Berman,
and Asselin present differing scenarios,
all continue the liberal-realist thesis that
there was no good solution for the
United States in Vietnam. They reject
Kissinger, White House Years, 288.
27. Jeffrey Kimball, The Vietnam War Files:
Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era
Strategy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2004), 24-28, 106, and 187.
28. Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon,
Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York:
The Free Press, 2001), 57 and 204; Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and
the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 17880.
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Nixon’s claim of peace with honor and
his insistence that his policies would
have been successful.
Despite evidence presented by Kimball
and Berman that Nixon and Kissinger
had little faith that Vietnamization was
working and that the White House considered the concept a rhetorical device to
justify to the American public continuing assistance to Saigon, Nixon and his
successor Gerald Ford insisted that Vietnamization was producing a viable regime in South Vietnam. Asselin finds
that Vietnamization was strengthening
Saigon’s forces but not fast enough to
accomplish its purposes. Nixon and
Kissinger both blamed Congress for a
lack of will to sustain Saigon financially
after 1973 and for thereby contributing
to the collapse of the RVN in 1975.
Nixon’s secretary of defense, Melvin
Laird, an advocate of Vietnamization
within the administration, reasserted the
Congress-was-to-blame thesis in a 2005
article in Foreign Affairs that admonished the Bush administration to “stay
the course” in Iraq and not lose the political will to continue. There is a preponderance of evidence, however, that
South Vietnam had a corrupt and poorly
led government, rampant inflation, and a
war-weary population in 1975, and that
U.S. support was all that had been giving
the RVN life. Chris Jespersen has described the Nixon and Ford administrations has having a “deliberate policy of
denial” of the real conditions. 29
29. T. Christopher Jespersen, “Kissinger, Ford,
and Congress: The Very Bitter End in Vietnam,”
Pacific Historical Review 71 (August 2002):
439. See also Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the
United States: Origins and Legacy of War (Boston: Twayne, 1990), 136-38; Marc Jason Gilbert,
“The Cost of Losing the ‘Other War’ in Vietnam,” in Why the North Won the Vietnam War,
187-88; Melvin Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs (Novem-
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As has long been the case, however,
the revisionist rebuttal remains present,
and not only in the memoirs of retired
officials like Laird. Respected military
historian Lewis Sorley has argued in his
much-read book, A Better War, that the
American leaders in Vietnam after
1968–General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and pacification director William Colby–made
Vietnamization effective. They were approaching the Nixon goal of enabling the
South Vietnamese to defend themselves,
he contends, until the American political
will to maintain the task in Vietnam finally ran out. Another equally reputable
military historian, James Willbanks, has
reviewed many of the same sources,
however, and concluded that Vietnamization came too late and that the incredibly ineffective Thieu government in Saigon had no chance for victory and was
able to survive only long enough to provide the decent interval that Washington
had sought. Thus the scholarly debate
continues. 30
If this dialogue were only some ivorytower exchange among professors or
confined to college seminar rooms it
would be interesting, but, in fact, it
shaped national security policy in the
real world in the first decade of the
twenty-first century. The revisionist interpretations of the Vietnam War that
lack of American success came from
ber/December 2005); and Asselin, A Bitter
Peace, 120, 169.
30. Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s
Last Years in Vietnam (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, 1999); James H. Willbanks, Abandoning
Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam
Lost Its War (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2004). For comments by historians such
as David Elliott and William Turley, who are
critical of the Sorley thesis, see Matt Steinglass,
“Vietnam and Victory,” Boston Globe, December 18, 2005.
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failed methods and not mistaken objectives characterized the thinking of many
U.S. leaders in the administration of
George W. Bush. The president said that
he had supported the containment rationale for U.S. policy and that “the essential lessons to be learned from the
Vietnam War” were that “we had politicians making military decisions” and
that presidents should set the goals and
“allow the military to come up with the
plans to achieve the objective.” 31 Two
of Bush’s key advisers, Vice President
Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, had been officials in the Nixon-Ford administrations.
There is evidence from their careers in
the three decades after the Vietnam War
that the American defeat in Vietnam led
them to a preoccupation with reestablishing and maintaining U.S. military
power. 32 Faced with a global threat to
U.S. security in the form of radical Islamic terrorism that recalled the Cold
War-era threat from an armed and radical foe, these leaders led the United
States again into a military intervention
in a regional political conflict to deter
this global danger and defend American
ideals.
Most historians, however, remain
persuaded by the orthodox argument that
American power failed in Vietnam because American purposes and interests
were not accurately aligned with the his31. Quoted in David L. Anderson, “One Vietnam War Should Be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History and the Making of
Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 30 (January
2006): 8.
32. James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking,
2004), 52; Marilyn B. Young, “Still Stuck in the
Big Muddy,” in Cold War Triumphalism: The
Misuse of History after the Fall of Communism,
ed. Ellen Schrecker (New York: The New Press,
2004), 262-73.

31

torical conditions in Southeast Asia after
World War II. As historian Lloyd Gardner has written, in the Vietnam War the
“victims were primarily the Vietnamese,
and its victors were the Vietnamese. . . .
The reality of Vietnam was as elusive to
American policymakers as the enemy
forces were to the men they sent to this
hall of mirrors.” 33 The logic of the liberal-realist view of the American war in
Vietnam is that it could have and should
have been avoided. Long before the
American war in Iraq began, Herring
reflected on the Vietnam War as an example of how intervention in the “poisonous tangle of local politics” can be
complicated, costly, and not easily resolved. The policy history of the American experience in Vietnam offers no
easy lessons but is a graphic caution. It
stands, in Herring’s view, “as an enduring testament to the pitfalls of interventionism and the limits of power.” 34
Vietnam presented an instructive example of the tragic result when strategists
fail to define the specific interests at
stake, the real cost involved, and thus the
reasonable form of any intervention in a
violent regional conflict. There should
be no more Vietnam.

33. Lloyd Gardner, “Hall of Mirrors,” in Why
the North Won the Vietnam War, 240. See also
David L. Anderson, The Vietnam War (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 123-28.
34. Herring, America’s Longest War, 4th ed.,
358.

Culture Society & Praxis
https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/csp/vol6/iss1/7

14

